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COMMENTARY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PRESSURES ON HEALTH CARE
COST CONTAINMENT
Andreas G. Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR WING'S BASIC premise-that health care cost in-
creases are a "fundamental problem" which must be addressed
by public policy-is irrefutable. This Commentary elaborates on
his analysis of the politics of health care cost containment by focus-
ing on Congress. Obviously, Congress is not the only branch of the
federal government that makes public policy decisions affecting
health care costs; the executive branch, the independent agencies,
and the judiciary have all shown more than a passing interest in this
matter. Furthermore, the federal government is not the only level
of government that concerns itself with health care costs; individual
states have become increasingly active in this area in recent years.
However, Congress does promulgate the statutes that define federal
health care policy, which in turn holds major potential to contain
health care costs.
This Commentary reviews the general perceptions of the health
care cost problem held by members of the House and the Senate
and describes the forces that will shape congressional policy deci-
sions regarding health care costs for the foreseeable future. It ap-
pears virtually certain that Congress will reduce the rate of increase
in federal expenditures, at least relative to what they would be
under current policy. However, it is unlikely that these policy
changes will have much effect on the "fundamental problem" of
health care cost increases for the economy or for the individual con-
sumers who are not federal program beneficiaries. Indeed, there is a
chance that Congress, in addressing the problem of federal cost in-
creases, may compound the problems facing individual consumers.
* Counsel, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives. A.B., Princeton (1970); J.D., University of Penn-
sylvania (1973). The views presented in this Commentary are those of the author and not of
the Subcommittee or its members.
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I. CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE COSTS
There are as many different perspectives on health care costs in
the Congress as there are Representatives and Senators. These per-
spectives are not widely known, however. Only a handful of Mem-
bers of the House or the Senate focus their personal and staff
energies on health policy issues on a regular basis. One reason for
this, as a thoughtful House Republican recently observed, is that
health has become a "take-away" area - not exactly an ideal foun-
dation for building a political career. Although there are not many
clearly articulated individual viewpoints, a few perceptions do ap-
pear to be widely held.'
One of the most widely held perceptions among members of
Congress is that the health care cost problem is attributable to ris-
ing federal health expenditures.' Members are constantly reminded
of increasing health care costs by the media, their constituents, ad-
vocacy groups, personal friends and family, who express concern
with the increasing financial burden of health care.
This lack of congressional initiative can in part be explained by
one basic dynamic: the cost problem is not one that members be-
lieved Congress must solve. For some, this belief is rooted in the
idea that the responsibility for containing health care costs properly
rests with the states or with private sector market mechanisms.
These members have no incentive to use the federal government's
regulatory or taxing policies to address the issue. But even for these
members, the high rate of increase in federal health spending re-
mains a concern and the political imperative of reducing the federal
deficit, as evidenced by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 19851 (generally referred to as the "Gramm-Rud-
1. Iglehart, Congress, Public Policy, and the Future: A Conversation with Bill Gradison,
4 HEALTH AFF., winter 1985, at 41, 42.
2. Federal spending for health care flows primarily through the two major health enti-
tlements, Medicare and Medicaid. However, the federal government also purchases health
care for its civilian employees and retirees through the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Program (FEHBP), for the dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees and
their dependents through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Serv-
ices (CHAMPUS), and for the dependents and survivors of certain veterans through the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Veterans' Administration (CHAMPVA). In
addition, the federal government directly operates three separate health care systems: the
Indian Health Service, the Veterans Administration Hospitals and Nursing Homes, and the
Department of Defense Medical System. Whether as payor or provider, the federal govern-
ment's health spending is increasing.
3. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1037 (2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. 1986)).
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man" Act), has turned the problem of rising federal health spending
into an issue Congress now finds itself forced to address.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected in its Febru-
ary 1986 estimates that federal outlays would exceed federal reve-
nues by $208 billion in the current fiscal year ending September 30,
1986. This amount is equal to five percent of the Gross National
Product. CBO also projected that the federal deficit would decline
from $181 billion in 19874 to $104 billion in 1991 under current
revenue and spending policies. While this is encouraging, it is not
legally sufficient because, as Table 1 illustrates, the Gramm-Rud-
man Act requires that the federal deficit be reduced each year for
the next five years, from $144 billion in 1987 to $0 by 1991. Even
though the Supreme Court has held the automatic spending reduc-
tion provisions of Gramm-Rudman unconstitutional,5 the Act's def-
icit targets remain in place and, as a practical political matter,
compel Congress to make tax and/or spending policy changes to
achieve the targets. These deficit targets will force some major re-
structuring of federal revenue and spending policies, since the
amount of "deficit reduction" must increase each year.6
TABLE 1
FEDERAL DEFICIT PROJECTIONS
AND TARGETS, FY 1987-1991
(in billions)
FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991
CBO Projections $181 $165 $144 $120 $104
Gramm-Rudman
Deficit Targets 144 108 72 36 0
Required Deficit
Reduction 37 57 72 84 104
Federal health programs, particularly the Medicare and Medi-
caid entitlements, are a major source of growth in federal spending.7
Table 2 displays CBO projections of outlays for Medicare, Medi-
caid, and discretionary health programs (including the health block
4. All dates cited herein refer to fiscal years unless otherwise noted.
5. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986). In Bowsher, the Supreme Court
held that the powers given to the Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman Act vio-
late the constitutional command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of laws.
Id. at 3192. See infra text accompanying note 21.
6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUT-
LOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1987-1991 Summary Table 1, at xiv (Feb. 1986).
7. See supra note 1.
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grants and biomedical research) over the next five years under cur-
rent policy.' It is evident that the rate of growth in Medicare (fifty-
seven percent) and Medicaid (twenty-eight percent) outstrips not
only the rate for discretionary health programs (twenty percent),
but also exceeds the rate for federal spending in the aggregate
(twenty-two percent). These numbers-not the increases in na-
tional health care expenditures nor the increases in the medical care
component of the consumer price index-shape congressional
thinking on health care costs.
TABLE 2
FEDERAL HEALTH SPENDING
PROJECTIONS
(outlays in billions)
FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991
Medicare $80.2 $90.1 $100.7 $112.5 $125.7
Medicaid 26.0 27.8 29.6 31.4 33.5
Discretionary
Health 9.8 10.2 10.7 11.2 11.8
Total Federal
Outlays 1025.0 1086.0 1135.0 1188.0 1248.0
Obviously, federal programs with high rates of spending growth
are not favored under Gramm-Rudman's declining deficit targets,
and open-ended entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicaid,
involving large sums of money, are even more suspect. In the zero-
sum game created by Gramm-Rudman, if Congress does not reduce
the rate of Medicare and Medicaid expenditure increases, then it
must cut deeper into defense spending, or into spending for other
non-defense programs, or it must raise revenues by a greater
amount.
Equally important, but politically less visible in the zero-sum
game created by Gramm-Rudman, are the health-related tax ex-
penditures. The largest expenditure of this type is the exclusion
from an employee's income of the amount an employer contributes
to an insurance plan which provides accident or health benefits,
whether the employer is insured or self-insured. Employer contri-
butions to fund such medical benefits are not subject to income, so-
cial security, or unemployment taxes. Table 3 shows the amounts
of federal revenues foregone as a result of this and other health-
8. See CBO, supra note 6, at 60, 70.
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related tax expenditures.9
TABLE 3
FEDERAL HEALTH-RELATED
TAX EXPENDITURES
(in billions)
FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 FY 1990
Exclusion of
Employer
Contributions $23.7 $26.4 $29.0 $32.2 $35.6
Deductibility of
Medical Costs 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.8 5.3
Exclusion of
Interest on
Hospital
Bonds 1.9 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.3
In theory, the revenue losses resulting from these tax expendi-
tures could be converted into a program of direct expenditures for
health services that is larger in size than the current Medicaid pro-
gram. Alternatively, these losses could be eliminated and the addi-
tional revenue could be used to reduce the deficit. It has also been
argued that placing a limit, or "tax cap," on the exclusion of the
employer contributions (taxing, for example, contributions exceed-
ing $200 per month for family coverage and $80 per month for indi-
vidual coverage), would eliminate the open-ended incentive to
purchase health coverage beyond the ceiling, and thus reduce de-
mand for health care services and ease the upward pressure on med-
ical care prices. 10
In practice, however, concern about health care costs does not
greatly influence congressional decisions regarding tax policy. Leg-
islative proposals embodying the "tax cap" approach have not been
adopted by either the House or Senate tax-writing committees, and
are not incorporated in the landmark tax reform legislation enacted
by the 99th Congress.11 Apparently the members do not view the
link between health-related tax expenditures and health care costs
as being very strong. It is clear that the interests which support the
9. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1986-1990, at 18-19 (Apr. 12, 1985).
10. See CBO, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 78-79
(Mar. 1986).
11. Tax Reform Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS I (special tax pamphlet).
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current policy of exclusions, and which include business, organized
labor and provider groups, are broad-based and highly persuasive.
A second general observation concerns members' perceptions of
individuals who face catastrophic health costs. In recent years, for
example, a great deal of congressional attention has focused on indi-
viduals who need organ transplants but cannot afford them, on indi-
viduals who receive organ transplants but cannot afford the
necessary post-operative immunosuppressive drugs, on ventilator-
dependent children who must live in hospitals or nursing homes
because their families cannot afford to care for them at home, on
elderly individuals with high drug expenses which are not covered
by Medicare, and on victims of Alzheimer's disease who will re-
quire costly nursing home care for the rest of their lives. Members
of Congress generally recognize that health care costs can pauperize
almost any American who is unfortunate enough to experience a
catastrophic illness or accident. However, their concern about
these sympathetic individual cases has not been translated into fed-
eral policy addressing the general problem of rising health care
costs. Instead, congressional response is more often directed at
solving the problem of the individual, or group of individuals, in
question.
The third perception generally held by members of Congress is
that vast amounts of money are being earned in the health care
field. The health-related political action committees (PACs) are
well-financed and generous with their contributions to Democrats
and Republicans alike. Although members are most likely unaware
that physician incomes are approximately five times that of the av-
erage American worker, they do realize that pharmaceutical com-
panies, physicians and most nursing homes, "do not take the vows
of poverty."12 Furthermore, many members of Congress invest
their money and are undoubtedly aware of the strong performance
of a number of health care company stocks and periodically, the
members are reminded by either the General Accounting Office or
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services that profiteering continues at the expense of the federal
government's programs. 3 The perceived financial prosperity of
health care providers may have made it easier for members to ra-
12. Iglehart, supra note 2, at 48.
13. Hospital Profits under PPS, Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Finance (Feb. 21, 1986) (testimony of Bryan B. Mitchell, Acting Deputy Inspector Gen. of
the Dep't of Health and Human Services).
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tionalize federal program cutbacks. It has not, however, resulted in
a political consensus to bring health care costs under control.
The final observation is that members appear to lack confidence
that a clear federal solution to the health care cost problem exists.
This is not just a policy disagreement about whether regulatory ap-
proaches or market-oriented approaches are preferable; it is more a
recognition that the nation's health care system is highly complex,
that it varies considerably from state to state and district to district,
and that it is undergoing a major change, in part driven by federal
policies such as Medicare's shift to a hospital prospective payment
system. There is also a disjuncture between the common policy pre-
scriptions for cost containment and the members' personal decisions
about health care. A recent informal survey by a McGraw-Hill
trade journal found that not one of the key members of Congress
and not one top Reagan administration official who have been pro-
moting capitation in Medicare and other federal programs is en-
rolled in a health maintenance organization.
14
II. CONGRESSIONAL DEFICIT POLITICS AND
HEALTH CARE COSTS
Since the decisive rejection of the Carter administration's hospi-
tal cost-containment legislation by the House in 1979, virtually all
cost-containment measures enacted by Congress have been included
in Medicare or Medicaid legislation. The Reagan administration
has, of course, helped to bring about some of these changes through
its constant pressure for domestic spending reductions. Ultimately,
however, it is the budget process that shapes Medicare and Medi-
caid policy."i The only major Medicare or Medicaid change that
occurred outside the budget process was the enactment of the Medi-
care prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services,
which was included in the Social Security Amendments of 1983.16
However, the political groundwork for this change was laid in the
preceding year's budget legislation.17 The budget process preceded
Mr. Reagan's arrival in the White House,18 and it is almost certain
14. Sorian & Richard, HMO-Phobia Strikes Administration, 40 MED. & HEALTH, May
12, 1986, at 6.
15. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: A
GENERAL EXPLANATION (July 1986) (serial number CP-9).
16. Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-07, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72.
17. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101, 96
Stat. 324, 331.
18. The budget process first mediated Medicare and Medicaid changes during the last
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to continue after his departure.
The enactment of Gramm-Rudman in 1985 has further tight-
ened the control of the budget process over Medicare and Medicaid
policy. In the interest of balancing the federal budget, Congress has
adopted a set of targets for the federal deficit 9 and an elaborate set
of enforcement measures, including rules governing the considera-
tion of bills on both the House and Senate floors.2" While the
Supreme Court overturned one of the enforcement measures-the
delegation of authority to the Comptroller General to enforce
across-the-board budget reductions-it left all other provisions of
the legislation intact.2 Congress immediately responded by adopt-
ing, and sending to the President for signature, the across-the-board
reductions that the Comptroller General would have presented to
the President. As of this writing, the principal sponsors have pro-
posed what they perceive as a remedy for the constitutional defect
in the automatic reduction procedure; whatever the fate of this pro-
posal, which was not adopted by the 99th Congress, it seems ex-
tremely unlikely that the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction targets,
or the current enforcement procedures for those targets, will be
repealed.
Thus, for the foreseeable future, Congress will be under enor-
mous political pressure to make increasingly difficult fiscal policy
choices consistent with the stringent requirements of the Gramm-
Rudman Act. These choices will cause policy changes in Medicare
and Medicaid which, in turn, will undoubtedly affect health care
cost increases in these programs and, perhaps, even have some im-
pact on cost increases in the health care sector generally. As of this
writing, Congress has had only nine months of experience under
Gramm-Rudman; the budget for 1987, which began October 1,
1986, was finally resolved on October 17, 1986, without a full text of
the new Gramm-Rudman procedures. However, enough changes
have taken place to illustrate the dynamics of Medicare and Medi-
caid policymaking within the budget process as modified by
Gramm-Rudman.
It is not the need of program beneficiaries, the interest of partici-
pating providers, nor the increase in health care costs generally that
year of the Carter administration. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499,
§§ 900-66, 94 Stat. 2599, 2609-55.
19. See supra Table I.
20. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, §§ 901, 902, 88 Stat. 297, 426, as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
21. See supra note 3.
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were the principal determinants of Medicare and Medicaid policy in
1986; it is the Gramm-Rudman deficit target of $144 billion for fis-
cal year 1987. The question was - and will in future years remain
- to what extent must Medicare and Medicaid contribute to the
mix of defense and non-defense spending reductions and revenue
increases to meet this target?
The budget process, within which this question is resolved, has
two basic steps. First, Congress adopts a budget resolution, which
is a blueprint for federal spending and taxing policy intended to
achieve the Gramm-Rudman targets for the upcoming fiscal year.22
Budget resolutions are not public laws; they are adopted by the the
House and the Senate and are binding on both Houses, but they are
not signed by the President. To effect program changes assumed in
the budget resolution, the budget reconciliation bill must first be
enacted. Only after this legislation has been signed into law by the
President may any expenditure reductions or tax increases be imple-
mented. The following brief summary describes the impact of this
process during 1986 on Medicare policy.
In January of 1986, the President submitted his budget for 1987
which purported to meet the Gramm-Rudman target with a deficit
of $143.6 billion.23 The President's proposals were designed to
achieve reductions in federal outlays by shifting costs to program
beneficiaries, states, and providers; they did not address the cost
problem in the health sector as a whole.
In February, the non-partisan CBO submitted its statutorily
mandated annual report on budgetary options to the House and
Senate Budget Committees.24 While some of these options-such
22. S. Con. Res. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
23. The CBO re-estimated the President's budget and projected the deficit at $159.7
billion due to a lower rate of real economic growth and a higher spending rate for defense
than the President had projected. CBO, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY
PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987, at vii (Feb. 1986). The President proposed: (1) to re-
duce federal outlays by $10 billion over the next five years by putting a cap on federal Medi-
caid matching payments to states, effectively converting the entitlement into an indexed block
grant; (2) to reduce federal outlays by $4.9 billion over the next five years by freezing public
health and discretionary health program spending at 1986 levels; and (3) to reduce federal
outlays for Medicare by $52.8 billion between 1987 and 1991. The major Medicare savings
would result from an increase in Part B premiums from 25% to 35% of program costs ($18
billion over five years), from a cut in payments to hospitals for operating and capital costs
($22.2 billion over five years), and from a reduction in payments for the direct and indirect
costs of medical education ($12.8 billion over five years). See id. at 85-91.
24. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, supra note 20, at
§ 202(f), 88 Stat. at 300. This report set forth a number of health-related options for lower-
ing the federal deficit. These options involved increasing federal revenues by (I) taxing some
employer-paid health insurance; (2) raising the Medicare hospital insurance payroll tax;
19861
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
as taxing employer-paid health insurance and eliminating tax-ex-
empt bond financing for hospitals-would arguably have an impact
on cost increases in the health care sector of the economy, the pri-
mary purpose and effect of most of the options was to reduce fed-
eral outlays or increase federal revenues.
On May 2, the Senate approved a budget resolution for 1987,25
that fixed the deficit at $144.65 billion for that year,26 Of the $27.55
billion in deficit reductions contained in the Senate version, $900
million was to be cut from Medicare and $260 million from
Medicaid.27
On May 15, the House adopted a budget resolution" that estab-
lished a deficit of $137.3 billion for 1987. Of the $34.9 billion in
deficit reductions, $300 million was to come only from Medicare.
Instead of reducing Medicaid outlays, the House resolution pro-
posed an increase of over $200 million in Medicaid spending for
1987.29
The House-Senate conference agreement, affirmed on June 26,
1986, called for a 1987 deficit of $142.6 billion, which is below the
Gramm-Rudman target of $144 billion. The conferees agreed to
$450 million in cuts in Medicare and approved an increase of just
over $100 million in Medicaid spending. 0 Table 4 summarizes the
(3) taxing a portion of Medicare benefits; (4) eliminating private-purpose tax-exempt hospital
bonds; and (5) imposing through the tax system an income-related premium on Medicare
beneficiaries for Part B services. The options also included reductions in federal outlays
which were sought to be achieved by (1) reducing Medicare payments for indirect medical
education costs and for direct medical education expenses; (2) lowering Medicare reimburse-
ment for capital expenditures; (3) adopting a fee schedule for paying physicians under Medi-
care Part B; (4) raising the Medicare Part B deductible; and (5) limiting Medicaid payments
for long-term care services. See CBO, supra note 10, at 78-101, 256-59.
25. S. Con. Res. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
26. Figures for Senate and House versions and the conference agreement are taken from
the Table entitled "Functional Comparison," 132 CONG. REC. H4408-09 (June 26, 1986).
27. "Deficit reductions" refers to the difference between the CBO-projected deficit of
$172.2 billion and the Senate's final deficit of $144.65 billion. The difference between the
initial CBO estimate of $181 billion and its mid-year estimate of $172.2 billion is largely
explained by the intervening enactment of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, on April 7, 1986.
28. H. Con. Res. 337, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
29. The considerable difference between the Senate and House resolutions derived
largely from the allocations for national defense; the House proposed outlays $5.75 billion
below those of the Senate.
30. At this stage of the budget process Medicare, Medicaid, and, where applicable, in-
come tax laws, are actually amended to achieve the net reductions called for by the budget
resolution. The proposed statutory changes are typically combined into an omnibus bill and
then follow the regular legislative route, taking effect only if passed by the House and Senate
and signed by the President. However, the CBO remains the final arbiter of the amount by
which a proposed policy changes federal outlays.
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President's budget proposals, the Senate and House versions, and
the conference agreement.
TABLE 4
FISCAL YEAR 1987 HEALTH BUDGET
(outlays in billions)
Reductions Medicare Medicaid Total Deficit
President's Budget - $ 4.7 - $1.3 - $ 21.6
Senate-passed Budget
Resolution 0.9 - 0.3 - 27.5
House-passed Budget
Resolution 0.3 + 0.2 - 34.9
Conference Report 0.45 + 0.1 - 29.6
The budget resolution approved by both the House and Senate
on June 26 contained "reconciliation" instructions to each of the
authorizing committees. These instructions directed the commit-
tees to report, by July 25, 1986, any changes in the laws within their
jurisdictions that would achieve the reductions in Medicare outlays
agreed to in the resolution.
For the authorizing committees, the challenge was to develop
politically acceptable and programmatically sound policy changes
that yield outlay reductions which would meet the reconciliation
instructions. This already complex and difficult task was made even
more formidable because these changes had to reduce outlays al-
most immediately; fiscal year 1987 began less than four months af-
ter the House and Senate agreed upon a budget which incorporated
the Gramm-Rudman targets. This compressed time-frame effec-
tively precluded any policy changes which might reduce federal
health outlays by moderating price inflation in the health sector.
Even if the CBO were willing to quantify any such changes, it
would be several years before the effects of major structural reforms
would be felt by federal programs. Furthermore, because virtually
any major cost-containment reform is likely to face serious political
opposition from some quarter, and because an authorizing commit-
tee earns no credit against its reconciliation target for proposing
such changes, the budget process does not produce legislative
changes that address the "fundamental problem" of health care cost
increases. Instead, it produces cuts in provider reimbursement
rates, increases in beneficiary cost-sharing obligations, and reduc-
tions in federal matching payments-changes that are concrete,
readily quantifiable, and immediate in their effect.
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The response of the authorizing committees to the 1987 Medi-
care reconciliation instructions illustrates how the budget process
shapes congressional health care cost containment. The two House
committees sharing Medicare jurisdiction made the following major
recommendations for Medicare outlay reductions: (1) elimination
of periodic interim payments to hospitals; (2) reductions in pay-
ments for inpatient hospital services; (3) reductions in capital pay-
ments to hospitals; (4) limitations on payments for cataract surgery;
and (5) modifications in payments for oxygen therapy.3 The Sen-
ate authorizing committee reported comparable but not identical
recommendations on issues (1), (2), and (3), and also proposed to
achieve further outlay reductions by providing that Medicare be the
secondary payor for all Medicare beneficiaries who elect to be cov-
ered by employment-based health insurance as a current employee
of a large employer. (The Senate committee also proposed to ex-
tend Medicare coverage, and the corresponding hospital insurance
payroll tax, to all state and local employees hired before April 1,
1986, raising nearly $5 billion in revenues over 3 years).32
Several points are worth noting about these House and Senate
authorizing committee recommendations. First, they are far nar-
rower in scope than either the President's proposals or the options
outlined by CBO. Second, with the exception of the Senate Medi-
caid secondary payor proposal, each of these proposals represents a
reduction in reimbursement to a particular class of providers partic-
ipating in the Medicare program. The proposals do not affect those
providers' payments which are derived from other payors; conse-
quently, the providers are free to try to transfer their Medicare
"losses" to some other purchaser. The recommendations are not
primarily meant to use Medicare's leverage to make providers be-
have in a more cost-effective manner toward non-Medicare patients.
Finally, although the House committees recommended other Medi-
care policy changes in connection with their reconciliation propos-
als, few of these recommendations are likely to have any impact on
cost increases in the health care sector.
This does not mean, however, that the budget process will never
result in generalized cost savings. One House proposal, directing
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to research the effec-
tiveness of selected medical treatments and surgical procedures
among the Medicare population, is intended to provide the basis for
31. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, H.R. 5300, §§ 4506, 4527, 4530, 10202, 10203,
10221, 10233, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
32. S. REP. No. 348, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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long-term reductions in inappropriately high utilization rates of
some treatments and procedures.33 Such reductions, if imple-
mented, could yield substantial savings to the Medicare program
and, to the extent that such reductions influence physicians' prac-
tice styles, they may yield savings to non-Medicare patients and
payors as well. Reductions in inappropriately high utilization rates
may also improve the quality of care. Unfortunately, because such
initiatives do not achieve outlay reductions and may even be consid-
ered "extraneous" to a reconciliation bill under Senate rules, the
merits of such proposals are often overlooked.34
The way in which Congress eventually resolved the differences
between the House and Senate Medicare reconciliation policies of-
fers a classic illustration of the vagaries of the budget process. On
August 20, 1986, the directors of the Congressional Budget Office
and the Office of Management and Budget issued their "snapshot"
of the federal budget, as required by the Gramm-Rudman law.3"
The directors estimated that the deficit for fiscal year 1987 would be
$163.4 billion, or $19.4 billion over the Gramm-Rudman target of
$144 billion. In the absence of a reconciliation bill or other spend-
ing reductions or revenue increases, across-the-board reductions of
$9.7 billion in both defense and non-defense programs would be re-
quired. Of even greater importance to Medicare, the CBO revised
its baseline assumptions regarding Medicare, converting many of
the House and Senate committee savings recommendations into
spending provisions.36 Thus, when the House and Senate reconcili-
ation conferees finally began negotiating in September, both Houses,
according to CBO, increased Medicare outlays over the fiscal year
1987 through 1989 period.37
The final Medicare conference agreement, as passed by the
House and the Senate on October 17, 1986, included the following
major cost-saving provisions: (1) reductions in payments for inpa-
33. Id. at § 4503.
34. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 20001(d), 100 Stat. 82, 390 (1986).
35. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,829 (Aug. 20, 1986).
36. For example, savings in the House bill from the periodic interim payment proposal,
which had been certified in writing by CBO on July 28, 1986, as saving $1.6 billion over 3
years, were transformed into costs of $2.5 billion under the August 20 baseline - a swing of
$4.1 billion in less than a month. The change is attributable to the promulgation by the
Health Care Financing Administration on August 15, 1986, of final regulations eliminating
periodic interim payment.
37. According to CBO, net Medicare outlays in the House bill over the 3-year period
were $600 million; in the Senate bill, $1.3 billion. The Senate proposal to bring uncovered
state and local employees into Medicare was treated as a revenue measure.
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tient hospital services; (2) reductions in capital payments to hospi-
tals; (3) establishment of Medicare as a secondary payor; and
(4) limitations on payments for cataract surgery. 38 However, ac-
cording to CBO, the savings resulting from these measures were
overwhelmed by the increased outlays resulting from other provi-
sions, such that, on net, the reconciliation conference agreement in-
creased Medicare outlays by nearly $500 million in fiscal year 1987,
and by over $1 billion in the fiscal year 1987 to 1989 period. Table
5 displays the estimated budget effect of the reconciliation bill
passed in October; a comparison with Table 4, setting forth the rec-
onciliation instructions contained in the fiscal 1987 budget resolu-
tion passed by the House and Senate in June, shows that, in crafting
program changes, Congress does not always strictly conform to its
own budgetary blueprints. It is instructive that, less than 3 weeks
after voting for the reconciliation bill, all of the members of the
House and one third of the Senate stood for reelection.
TABLE 5
BUDGET EFFECT OF FY 1987
RECONCILIATION PROVISIONS
(outlays in billions)
FY 1987 FY 1987-1989
Medicare + $ 0.495 + $ 1.086
Medicaid + .170 + 1.083
The Medicare spending in the reconciliation bill did not prevent
the Congress from meeting its Gramm-Rudman target, however.
Other savings measures and revenue increases contained in the con-
ference agreement offset this Medicare spending, yielding net outlay
reductions of $11.7 billion in fiscal year 1987. These reconciliation
savings, combined with an estimated increase of $11.4 billion in fis-
cal year 1987 revenues from the Tax Reform Act and smaller
amounts of savings or revenue increases from other bills, enabled
Congress to come under the $154 billion "trigger" for an across-the-
board sequestration, effectively meeting the $144 billion Gramm-
Rudman deficit target for fiscal year 1987. 39
38. Sections 9302, 9303, 9319, and 9334 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986, P.L. 99-509.
39. See statement of Senator Domenici, 132 Cong. Rec. S16,922 (October 17, 1986).
The Gramm-Rudman law allows a $10 billion margin of error in any given fiscal year for
avoiding a sequestration order.
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III. CONCLUSION
What does all this arcane congressional procedure have to do
with the "fundamental problem" of health care cost increases? A
good deal and then again, not much at all. On the one hand, the
budget process has a good deal to do with the health care cost in-
creases because it is, as a practical matter, the only way in which
Congress acts on health care cost-containment issues. On the other
hand, the budget process has very little to do with solving the prob-
lem of rising health expenditures because it has as its sole objective
the development of a federal budget that meets the Gramm-Rud-
man deficit targets. As this Commentary has demonstrated, the in-
centives in the budget process all work to develop short-term,
quantifiable cost-containment strategies that are limited in scope to
Medicare and Medicaid instead of encouraging the development of
proposals that address the fundamental problem of increasing costs
which faces society.
The budget process is certainly not the only influence on con-
gressional health policy decisions. Good old-fashioned partisan
politics, the new political action committees, state and regional geo-
politics, and other familiar factors are also at work. Moreover, the
budget process has been changed in the past and will inevitably be
changed in the future. For the time being, however, it has a power-
ful effect on congressional health policy. Although it may work to
reduce the rate of increase in federal health care expenditure, it is
unlikely to solve the "fundamental problem" of health care costs.
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